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a b s t r a c t 
This study shows that a group of individual investors in the financial markets displays symptoms of com- 
pulsive gambling, or an addiction to trading, based on a standard diagnostic checklist from the American 
Psychiatric Association. In a representative sample of Dutch retail investors, we find that 4.4% of the 
investors meet the criteria for compulsive gambling in the financial markets. Another 3.6% meet the cri- 
teria for problem gambling, which is a less severe form of gambling disorder. Investors with symptoms 
of compulsive gambling problems tend to follow a more active and speculative trading style, indicated by 
a higher frequency of stock trading, day-trading and investing in derivatives and leveraged products. 








































In this paper we adopt a diagnostic checklist from the Amer-
can Psychiatric Association (APA) to assess how many individual
nvestors in the financial markets show symptoms of gambling
isorder, a behavioral addiction to trading financial products. There
s a rich literature on individual investor behavior showing that
ome retail investors actively trade stocks, options and speculative
roducts such as Bitcoin, even though frequent trading typically
eads to poor portfolio returns. 1 Barber and Odean (20 0 0 ; 20 01 )
rgue that these investors are overconfident and overestimate
he precision of their private information. Another explanation is
hat investors simply trade actively because they like it ( Black,
986 ) and directly derive non-financial utility from their trading
ctivities. For example, some investors could be trading as a form
f entertainment, or gambling ( Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009 ;
rinblatt and Keloharju 20 09 ; Kumar, 20 09 ; Dorn et al., 2015 ; Gao
nd Lin, 2015 ). ∗ Corresponding author at: Mahidol University, College of Management, 69 
ipawadee Rangsit Rd., 10400, Bangkok, Thailand. 
E-mail addresses: roy.kou@mahidol.ac.th , kouwenberg@ese.eur.nl 
(R. Kouwenberg). 
1 See Odean (1999) , Barber and Odean (20 0 0) , Bauer, Cosemans and Eichholtz 










378-4266/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Statman (2002) and Kumar (2009) argue that investors can
se stock trading as a direct substitute for traditional forms of
ambling such as lotteries, casinos and sports betting. Spec-
lation in financial markets offers large payoffs and provides
nvestors with immediate feedback about gains and losses. This
s similar to conventional forms of gambling, but arguably with
etter odds of winning and with lower fees ( Arthur et al., 2016 ).
umar (2009) shows that individual investors who prefer specu-
ative stocks tend to have the same socio-demographic profile as
amblers. Evidence that trading can be used as a substitute for
ambling comes from studies that document a significant decrease
n stock trading volume by individual investors on days with draw-
ngs of large lottery jackpots ( Dorn et al., 2015 ; Gao and Lin, 2015 ).
urther, Mills and Nower (2019) report that more than half of fre-
uent gamblers in the U.S. also trade crypto-currencies like Bitcoin.
One concern about trading as a form of gambling is that it may
ecome problematic, or even compulsive for a small subgroup.
he literature shows evidence of people seeking treatment for
n addiction to trading in studies conducted in gambling clinics
round the world, including Spain ( Granero et al., 2012 ), France
 Grall-Bronnec et al., 2017 ), and Korea ( Shin et al., 2015 ). Youn
t al. (2016) developed a compulsive trading as gambling scale
hat they fielded in a survey among Korean individual investors.
hey report that 21.5% of Korean investors meet the criteria for
ompulsive gambling. Further, Kamolsareeratana and Kouwenberg
2019) find that 14.4% of a sample of retail investors in Thailand






























































































































b  display symptoms of compulsive or problematic gambling in the
stock market. In addition, Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) find that
two survey items that identify compulsive gamblers are associated
with excessive portfolio turnover among German retail investors. 
In this paper we use two unique investor survey datasets to
measure the proportion of individual investors in the Netherlands
that show symptoms of compulsive gambling in the financial mar-
kets. The purpose is to investigate the existence and prevalence of
compulsive gambling in the financial markets. Further, we validate
the trading addiction screen by testing if it is associated with
more frequent and speculative trading behaviors, such as a higher
stock trading frequency, day trading and investing in derivatives
and leveraged products. In addition, we test if compulsive gam-
bling is associated with a deteriorating financial situation, such as
accumulating debt or struggling to pay bills on time. 
The psychiatric literature defines compulsive gambling as
persistent and counter-productive gambling behavior ( APA, 2013 ).
Compulsive gamblers have an irresistible urge to place bets, re-
gardless of the losses and other negative consequences that the
gambling activities cause in their life. Evidence from gambling
clinics shows that in extreme cases trading as gambling can also
become addictive, to the point where medical treatment is needed
( Granero et al., 2012 ; Shin et al., 2015 ; Grall-Bronnec et al., 2017 ).
In our investor surveys we field a standard measure for compul-
sive gambling from the American Psychiatric Association, which
screens for nine symptoms of compulsive gambling behavior.
Typical symptoms of compulsive gambling are having difficulty to
stop gambling, lying to hide involvement with gambling, and jeop-
ardizing relationships or career opportunities because of gambling.
In our representative sample of Dutch investors, we find that
4.4% of the investors show symptoms of compulsive gambling,
or in other words a trading addiction. Furthermore, another 3.6%
of the investors can be categorized as problem gamblers, which
is less severe than compulsive gambling but still excessive and
potentially problematic. As a validation of the trading addiction
scale, we confirm that it is associated with more active and
speculative trading styles, even after controlling for other relevant
factors such as overconfidence and high risk tolerance. In addition,
investors displaying compulsive gambling symptoms tend to be
in a significantly worse financial situation compared to investors
with an otherwise similar demographic profile. 
An effective screen for compulsive gambling in the financial
markets should identify investors with serious gambling problems,
while excluding those who simply enjoy a speculative trading style
without having issues. For this reason, the survey also included
four other measures for the gambling motives of investors, to
contrast and compare with the compulsive gambling screen. A
well-known motive for gambling is sensation seeking, taking risks
just for the sake of the experience and the thrill of it ( Zuckerman,
1994 ). A second gambling motive is the aspiration for riches,
the small chance that trading offers to quickly gain relatively
large amounts of money ( Conlisk, 1993 ). Our survey included two
questions asking the investors whether they mainly trade for the
fun and challenge of it, or to chase a small chance to become
rich. We also assess the investors’ gambling motives indirectly,
by measuring the propensity to engage in conventional gambling
activities. In our survey we asked investors if they gambled in
the last 12 months, such as in casinos, sports betting, and on
slot machines. In addition, we measure the DOSPERT gambling
risk-taking scale ( Weber et al., 2002 ), a proxy for the propensity
to gamble with real money at stake. 
Our results show that more innocuous gambling motives for
trading, such as trading for fun (44.7%) or for a small chance to be-
come rich (13.4%), are more widespread than compulsive gambling
disorder in the financial markets (4.4%). Further, investors with
these two gambling motives trade less actively than compulsiveamblers, and they are in a similar financial situation as other
nvestors. Investors that sometimes gamble outside the financial
arkets (casinos, slot machines, sports betting, or card games) do
end to display more active and speculative trading behavior, and
re in a slightly worse financial situation on average, but not to
he same extent as trading addicts. These results confirm that the
ompulsive gambling screen is exclusive, and not just picking up
ny investor with gambling motives. 
This paper is the first in the literature to estimate how per-
asive compulsive gambling in the financial markets is for a
epresentative sample of individual investors, contributing to the
iterature on gambling disorders. Moreover, we complement the
vidence in Dorn et al. (2015) and Gao and Lin (2015) , who use
otteries as natural experiments to demonstrate a relation between
ambling desires and individual investor trading, by using a survey
pproach to directly identify investors who gamble in the financial
arkets. Our findings corroborate with the fun and excitement
ypothesis in Gao and Lin (2015) , as many investors reveal in
ur survey that they trade financial products for fun or a small
hance to become rich as if they are gambling, while a small group
isplay symptoms of compulsive gambling. Our study of Dutch
nvestors also contributes to the literature on individual investor
rading behavior, adding another piece of evidence to earlier work
hat focused on Taiwan ( Gao and Lin, 2015 ), Germany and the U.S.
 Dorn et al., 2015 ). 
In addition, we validate the compulsive gambling screen
dopted for trading financial products, by showing that it is asso-
iated with more speculative trading styles and a higher incidence
f financial problems. We demonstrate that the compulsive gam-
ling screen is exclusive and isolates a relatively small group of
nvestors. Our results are relevant for brokers and policy makers,
ecause compulsive gambling is known to have large negative
ffects on people’s wealth, health and family relations, with sub-
tantial costs for society as a whole. Gerstein et al. (1999) estimate
he costs of pathological gambling in the US alone as 4.7 billion
ollar annually. Screening for compulsive gambling in the financial
arkets may help to identify those investors who are most at
isk of developing unsustainable trading behavior. In addition,
n the past decade highly speculative leveraged products and
rypto-currencies have become available to individual investors
n unregulated offshore markets. Some of these new financial
roducts facilitate gambling on short-term price movements with
nvestment horizons as short as a few seconds (see Fig. 1 ), which
ould attract people with gambling problems ( Arthur et al., 2016 ;
ills and Nower, 2019 ). 
Although trading as gambling may only concern a small
umber of retail investors, it can also materially affect prices in
he financial markets due to the disproportional trading volume
nd coordination by gamblers. For example, Han and Kumar
2013) find that lottery-type stocks favored by retail investors with
igh gambling propensity are overpriced, Kumar et al. (2016) show
hat trading by gambling-motivated investors generates excess
eturn comovement among stocks with lottery features, and Bali
t al. (2017) argue that the low beta anomaly can be explained by
etail investors’ demand for lottery-like stocks. 
. Gambling motives for trading 
Prior studies argue that some investors may enjoy gambling in
he financial markets ( Dorn and Sengmuller, 2009 ; Kumar, 2009 ),
n the same way that people enjoy buying lottery tickets and gam-
ling in casinos. However, for some investors trading as a form
f gambling may become compulsive ( Granero et al., 2012 ; Shin
t al., 2015 ; Youn et al., 2016 ; Grall-Bronnec et al., 2017 ), and our
ain objective is to measure the prevalence of compulsive gam-
ling in a representative sample of Dutch investors. The measure
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Fig. 1. Example of an advertisement for a binary option. 





















a  or compulsive gambling in the financial markets is explained in
ection 2.1 below. 
Further, in this section we review the literature on the gam-
ling motivations that investors might have for trading in financial
arkets, such as trading for fun and trading to become rich
uickly. We also describe our direct and indirect measures for
hese gambling motives. Our purpose is to see if the group of
ompulsive gamblers in the financial markets is smaller than the
roup of investors with these more innocuous gambling motives,
nd whether the trading behaviors and financial problems of the
rading addicts are more extreme. .1. Compulsive gambling 
It is well-established in the psychiatric literature that for
 small group of people gambling can become excessive and
roblematic. Compulsive gambling is defined as ‘persistent and
ecurrent counter-productive gambling behavior’ and character- 
zed by the inability to control the urge to gamble ( APA, 2013 ).
his can ultimately have harmful consequences, such as financial
ifficulties, health issues and relationship problems ( Blaszczynski
nd Nower, 2002 ). Youn et al. (2016) and Kamolsareeratana
nd Kouwenberg (2019) provide evidence that some individual



















































































































t  investors in Korea and Thailand display symptoms of compulsive
gambling behavior in the stock market. Compulsive gambling is of-
ten accompanied with other serious problems, such as depression,
substance use and financial difficulties. Related, Engelberg and
Parsons (2016) show that stock market declines almost instantly
impact the physical health of some investors, as hospitalization
rates for mental health problems such as anxiety and depression
increase significantly over the next two days. This underscores the
importance to distinguish compulsive gambling from other less
harmful gambling activities. 
Psychiatrists typically use the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, DSM-5, of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion ( APA, 2013 ) to diagnose compulsive gambling. It defines nine
symptoms, such as “Needs to gamble with increasing amounts of
money in order to achieve the desired excitement” and “Has made
repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling”.
A person displaying at least four out of nine symptoms is typically
classified as a compulsive gambler ( APA, 2013 ). 
Following Youn et al. (2016) , we adapt the DSM-5 diagnostic
criteria to measure compulsive gambling behavior in the financial
markets by replacing the word ‘gambling’ with ‘trading financial
products’: see Appendix A . We use scores of four and higher on
the nine DSM-5 questions as an indicator for compulsive gambling
in the financial markets. Respondents with a score of three symp-
toms are considered to be problem gamblers ( Welte et al., 2015 ),
which is a less severe form of gambling disorder ( Volberg, 2001 ).
We note that a survey measure only provides an indication of
potential gambling problems, while actual diagnosis of compulsive
behavior involves multiple observations by a psychiatrist. However,
that being said, it is standard practice in the gambling literature to
estimate the prevalence of compulsive gambling in the population
with survey questions based on APA DSM diagnostic criteria (see,
for example, Stucki and Rihs-Middel, 2007 , and Welte et al., 2015 ) 
2.2. Motives for gambling in the stock market 
Apart from compulsive trading as gambling, investors may also
have more innocuous motivations for gambling in the financial
markets, such as trading for fun, or for a small chance to become
rich. Our survey also included several other questions to measure
the investors’ gambling motives, both directly and indirectly. 
2.2.1. Sensation seeking motive 
Sensation seeking is a personality trait where individuals take
risks just for fun or the thrill of the experience ( Zuckerman, 1994 ).
Horvath and Zuckerman (1993) document that sensation seeking
is positively related to risky behavior in many domains, includ-
ing gambling and financial risk-taking. Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2009) find that sensation-seeking investors tend to trade more
frequently, using the number of speeding tickets as a proxy for the
trait. Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) use survey questions to elicit if
retail investors trade for fun and entertainment, and they find that
those who enjoy trading tend to have a portfolio turnover rate
that is twice those of other investors. We follow the approach of
Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) and measure the sensation seeking
motive by an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent
mentions that “the fun or the challenge of investing” is among his
investment objectives. See Appendix A for the survey questions. 
2.2.2. Gambling to become rich motive 
Statman (2002) and Dorn and Sengmuller (2009) argue that
investors might also actively trade stocks to pursue a small
chance to become rich, similar to lottery players. Related, Kumar
(2009) shows that especially low-income investors tend to trade
“lottery stocks” that offer a small chance of realizing an extreme
positive return. In addition, Kumar (2009) demonstrates that therading volume of lottery stocks tends to rise during economic
ownturns when wealth levels are depressed. Kahneman and
versky (1979) document that when wealth falls below a person’s
spiration level, or reference point, it can trigger risk-seeking
ehavior. We measure the wealth aspiration gambling motive by
 dummy variable that equals one if investors indicate that their
nvestment objective is “to give me a small chance to get rich, and
 am willing to take risk for this purpose” (see Appendix A ). 
.2.3. Conventional gambling activities as an indirect proxy for 
ambling motives 
Recent studies argue that stock market trading is sometimes
sed by investors as a substitute for participating in conventional
ambling activities, such as lotteries, casinos and sports betting
 Kumar, 2009 ; Dorn et al., 2015 ; Gao and Lin, 2015 ). Similar to
onventional forms of gambling, speculating in the financial mar-
ets can offer large payoffs with instant feedback about gains and
osses. Gao and Lin (2015) and Dorn et al. (2015) show that stock
rading volume by individual investors decreases substantially
n days when large and salient lottery jackpots are drawn. For
xample, the trading volume of Taiwanese stocks that are likely
o attract individual traders drops up to 7% on large jackpot days
 Gao and Lin, 2015 ). 
To measure the gambling motives of investors indirectly, we
se a survey question asking investors if they participated in any
f the following conventional gambling activities over the last
welve months: playing slot machines, gambling in casinos, online
ambling, sports betting and playing in real money poker games.
owever, a potential drawback of this measure is that it neither
onsiders the amount of risk individuals are willing to take when
ambling, nor how likely it is they will gamble again in the future.
herefore, as a second measure we use the DOSPERT gambling
isk-taking propensity scale of Weber et al. (2002) , applied previ-
usly by Markiewicz and Weber (2013) to explain trading volume
n an experimental market. The first question of the DOSPERT-scale
sks: “How likely is it that you will participate in the following
ctivities? Betting with 100 euro or more on a slot machine.”
he question is answered on a 5-point scale ranging from “Very
nlikely” to “Very likely”. Three similar questions follow about
etting with 100 euro or more in a casino, on a sports game, or on
 poker game (see Appendix A ). The DOSPERT scale is the average
f the four responses, ranging from 1 to 5. We also construct a
ambling propensity dummy equal to one if the respondent has a
core of 3 or higher on at least one of the four questions, showing
ome tendency to gamble with real money at stake. 
. Data 
.1. Investor surveys 
Our data was collected in 2017 using two different panels of
utch individual investors. The first panel is the Dutch National
ank Household Survey (DHS) which is operated by CentERdata,
 research institute affiliated to Tilburg University specialized in
ocioeconomic research. Our second dataset is obtained via a panel
f the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets (AFM). 
The DHS panel contains 2300 members and is representative
or the Dutch population. Members of the DHS receive a small
ompensation for each survey that they complete. We fielded a
ustom survey in the DHS in October 2017, targeting all 375 panel
embers who owned financial assets, as well as a reference group
f 300 non-investors. We received a total of 619 responses. Our
urvey module asked “Do you invest (in financial assets)?”, and
74 of the respondents classified themselves as investors. Out of
hese 274 investors, only 106 traded stocks, ETF’s, derivatives or














































































































t  everaged products themselves during the past twelve months. 2 
ur main analysis is based on this subsample of 106 direct in-
estors, as our aim is to investigate speculative trading behavior
nd its relation with gambling problems. 
We obtained additional data by fielding our survey in the
FM-panel in March 2017. The AFM is the Dutch equivalent of
he United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
upervises the conduct of financial institutions in savings, invest-
ents, insurance and loan markets. The AFM regularly conducts
urveys in its own panel of 1733 members. The panel is composed
f individuals who previously contacted AFM with questions or
omplaints (40%), members who enrolled voluntarily (10%) and
ndividuals recruited from a large representative panel managed
y the market research company GfK (50%). The AFM panel is
ot representative for the Dutch population because it overweighs
ndividual investors, but this is suitable for our purposes. Our
urvey was distributed to all AFM panel members and within a
eek we received 866 responses, corresponding to a 50% response
ate. 3 Among the AFM respondents only 259 directly invest in
tocks, ETF’s, derivatives or leveraged products and are relevant for
ur study. 
.2. Demographics of the investor samples 
Descriptive statistics of the socio-demographic variables for
oth the DHS and AFM sample are reported in Table 1 , as well
s for the combined group of DHS and AFM investors. Significant
ifferences in means or proportions between the two datasets are
ndicated by stars ( ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ for 1%, 5% and 10%). First of all, we
ote that the typical Dutch direct investor is a 60-year old man
ith a bachelor or master degree. 4 Further, the large majority of
nvestors (about 90%) have more than five years of investment
xperience, while only one out five investors has access to a
nancial advisor. The two investor samples are similar in these
ey aspects, but also differ significantly on some others: investors
n the AFM-panel are wealthier, have higher income and are more
ikely to be business owners. 
.3. Control variables 
Our survey also includes measures for other key variables that
an explain trading behavior based on the literature, namely risk
olerance, overconfidence and financial literacy. Risk tolerance
s assessed using the general risk question of Dohmen et al.
2011) and measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 indicating
Not willing to take risks” to 10 being “Very willing to take risks”.
inancial literacy is measured by the “Big Three” financial literacy
uestions developed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) , which were
elded in both the DHS and AFM panel. Our measure of financial
iteracy is the number of correct responses to the three questions,
overing knowledge of interest, inflation and diversification (see
ppendix A ). 
We also measure one type of overconfidence, namely the
etter-than-average effect (see Glaser and Weber, 2007 ). The
urvey asks the respondents to compare their investment abilities
o the average investor on a 5-point response scale, ranging from
 being “Much worse” to 5 “Much better”. We create a dummy2 The remaining 168 investors have delegated all their trading decisions to a bro- 
er, or they only invest in bonds, mutual funds or property, assets less prone to 
ctive and speculative trading. 
3 Panel members recruited by GfK receive compensation for their participation, 
hile the voluntary enrolled AFM panel members participate in a semi-annual lot- 
ery to win a lunch with AFM’s CEO. 
4 Less than 10% of the investors are younger than 35 years in the DHS, and less 
han 10% are younger than 45 years in the AFM panel. Female investors are almost 






aariable for the ‘better-than-average’ form of overconfidence that
quals one if the investor indicates that his performance is just as
ood, better or much better than average, while having a financial
iteracy score that is below average. 
.4. Trading behavior and financial situation 
Our survey includes several questions on trading behavior
uring the last 12 months. We use five variables to capture
peculative trading behavior. Stock trading frequency measures the
requency at which the investor trades individual stocks on a
-point scale: 1 = “I barely trade”, 2 = “1–10 times/year”, 3 = “1–10
imes/month”, 4 = “3–4 times/week”, 5 = “almost every day”. We
onstruct a dummy for High stock trading frequency that equals one
f the investor trades stocks at least three days a week, or more
ften. Respondents are also asked if they bought and sold the
ame stock within a single day, which we recode into the indicator
ariable Day trading . 5 We also ask respondents how many different
ndividual stocks they hold in their portfolio, as a measure of di-
ersification. Finally, investors are asked if they traded or invested
n derivatives and leveraged products during the last 12 months. 
Summary statistics of the trading variables are shown in Panel
 of Table 1 . Investors in both samples trade stocks quite infre-
uently, with the most common answer being “1–10 times per
ear”. Only 9% of the investors in the AFM panel trade stocks at
east three times a week, versus a mere 2% of the DHS investors.
he prevalence of day trading is around 20% in both samples.
ence, only a minority of the direct investors in the Dutch
opulation trade stocks frequently. AFM investors tend to trade
omewhat more actively, and hold more stocks in their portfolio
elative to the DHS sample. 6 Trading in derivatives and leveraged
roducts is also rare in the DHS sample (11 % and 4%, respectively),
ut slightly more common in the AFM sample (28% and 12%). 
Finally, Panel C of Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics of
ur three measures of the investor’s financial situation, defined in
ppendix A . Most investors experience no difficulties making ends
eet and have few financial problems. Only 15% of the investors
xperienced at least one financial problem during the last 12
onths, such as receiving a letter from a debt collecting agency,
r failing to pay the rent or mortgage on time. There are no
ignificant differences in the mean values of the financial situation
ariables between the two samples. 
. Results 
.1. Prevalence of compulsive gambling in the financial markets 
As shown in Panel A of Table 2 , the typical Dutch investor dis-
lays almost no symptoms of compulsive gambling in the financial
arkets: 53% has no symptoms at all, while the average number
f symptoms is about 1. However, still, 5.7% (DHS) and 3.9% (AFM)
f the investors in both samples can be classified as potential
ompulsive gamblers in the financial markets, or trading addicts,
ecause they display four or more DSM-5 symptoms. There is no
ignificant difference in the proportion of trading addicts between
he DHS and the AFM samples. Overall, 4.4% of the investors in
he combined sample, or 1 out of 23 investors, is classified as
 potential trading addict based on their responses, with a 95%
onfidence interval of [2.5%, 7.0%]. 7 5 Barber et al. (2014) find that day trading accounts for more than 20% of the 
otal trading volume in Taiwan, but the vast majority of day traders lose money. 
6 The median number of different individual stocks owned is four in the DHS and 
ix in the AFM sample. 
7 For the 5.7% estimate in the DHS the 95% confidence interval is [2.1%, 11.9%], 
nd for the 3.9% in AFM it is [1.9%, 7.0%]. 
6 R. Cox, A. Kamolsareeratana and R. Kouwenberg / Journal of Banking and Finance 111 (2020) 105709 
Table 1 
Summary statistics of the investor datasets. 
Panel A of this table shows the means of several socio-demographic variables for the Dutch investors in the DHS and AFM panel datasets. The mean (or proportion) is shown 
separately for the sample of investors from the DHS panel and the AFM panel, as well as for the combined sample of investors (DHS & AFM). Panel B shows the means of 
several control variables for trading behavior measured in both panels, such as risk aversion and overconfidence. Panel C shows means for variables measuring the trading 
behavior and the financial situation of the investors. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significant differences in the mean or proportion between the DHS and AFM samples, at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. 
Panel A: Demographics Combined Sample DHS Sample AFM Sample 
Mean Mean Mean 
Age in years 60.8 59.0 61.5 
Male 92.9% 90.6% 93.8% 
Single 21.7% 27.4% 19.3% ∗
Low education 6.4% 11.3% 4.3% ∗∗
High school education 20.6% 24.5% 18.9% 
Bachelor education 42.5% 35.8% 45.3% ∗
Master education 30.6% 28.3% 31.5% 
Low income ( < 39k euro) 20.0% 25.5% 17.7% ∗
Medium income (39k to 78k euro) 40.3% 54.7% 34.3% ∗∗∗
High income ( > 78k euro) 31.1% 19.8% 35.8% ∗∗∗
Low wealth ( < 50k euro) 23.1% 34.9% 18.1% ∗∗∗
Medium wealth (50k to 150k euro) 23.3% 31.1% 20.1% ∗∗
High wealth ( > 150k euro) 43.3% 33.0% 47.6% ∗∗
Low stock trading experience ( < 1 year) 2.1% 1.0% 2.6% 
Medium stock trading exp. (1–5 years) 8.7% 14.0% 6.4% ∗∗
High stock trading experience ( > 5 years) 89.2% 85.0% 91.0% 
Regular employment 38.1% 46.2% 34.6% ∗∗
Business owner 14.7% 8.5% 17.3% ∗∗
Retired 41.1% 39.6% 41.7% 
Unemployed/disabled/other dummy 6.1% 5.7% 6.3% 
Has access to financial advisor 22.5% 17.9% 24.3% 
Observations 365 106 259 
Panel B: Control variables 
Risk tolerance scale from 1 to 10 5.92 5.53 6.09 ∗∗
Financial literacy score (0–3 correct) 2.81 2.82 2.80 
Self-assessed investment skill 1–5 (1 = Much worse than average, …, 4 = Better, 5 = Much better) 2.93 2.80 2.98 ∗∗
Overconfidence better-than-average (% who think they are better or just as good, but financial 
literacy below avg.) 
11.5% 9.4% 12.4% 
Panel C: Dependent variables 
Stock trading frequency, scale 1–5 (1 = I barely trade, …, 5 = almost every day) 2.28 1.88 2.46 ∗∗∗
(1) I barely trade 17.7% 29.0% 12.8% ∗∗∗
(2) 1–10 times per year 46.7% 56.0% 42.7% ∗∗
(3) 1–10 times per month 28.7% 13.0% 35.5% ∗∗∗
(4) 3–4 times per week 3.3% 2.0% 3.9% 
(5) Almost every day 3.6% 0.0% 5.1% ∗∗
High stock trading frequency (at least 3 times a week or more) 6.9% 2.0% 9.0% ∗∗
Day trading stocks 21.0% 19.0% 21.8% 
Number of stocks 8.5 5.1 10.0 ∗∗∗
Investing in derivatives 23.0% 11.3% 27.8% ∗∗∗
Investing in leveraged products 9.6% 3.8% 12.0% ∗∗
Making ends meet scale 1–5 (1 = very easy, …, 5 = very difficult) 1.79 1.98 1.72 ∗∗∗
Financial situation scale 1–5 (1 = money left over, …, 5 = debt increasing) 1.92 2.01 1.89 
Financial situation deteriorating dummy 9.6% 11.0% 9.1% 
Number of financial problems (0–8) 0.30 0.26 0.32 
Has at least one serious financial problem 14.9% 15.2% 14.8% 
Observations 365 106 259 























8 An interesting approach for future research is to apply a list randomization 
technique, where sensitive questions are hidden in a block of neutral questions and 
the respondent only indicates how many of the statements in a block are correct. 
This approach can improve estimates of prevalence rates for sensitive behaviours 
such as compulsive gambling. A drawback is that it does not identify exactly which 
respondents in the sample are a compulsive gambler. To put this result in perspective, a meta-study by Stucki and
Rihs-Middel (2007) estimates the rate of gambling disorder in
the global population as 1.9%, considering conventional ways of
gambling (casinos, slot machines, sports betting, etc.). Two large
survey studies estimate the rate of compulsive gambling in the
Dutch general population as only 0.2% ( Goudriaan, 2014 ). One
reason that the compulsive gambling rate is considerably higher at
4.4% in our sample of Dutch investors is that we consider investors
who directly trade stocks and financial products themselves, al-
ready implying some exposure to financial gains and losses that
some may find attractive from a gambling perspective. 
We note that our estimate of 4.4% potential compulsive gam-
blers among Dutch direct investors probably understates the actual
number of trading addicts in the financial markets. The reason
is that more investors will likely try to conceal or mask theirambling problems by giving false survey responses, compared
o respondents incorrectly declaring more symptoms than they
ctually have. It is more usual for people to conceal problematic
ehavior until it starts to affect others surrounding them. Hence,
ur estimate can be considered as a lower bound for the real
ccurrence of compulsive gambling among Dutch retail investors. 8 
Table 2 in addition shows that apart from the 4.4% of investors
lassified as possible trading addicts because they display four
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Table 2 
Compulsive gambling in the financial markets and gambling motives. 
Panel A of this table shows the mean of the APA DSM-5 scale for compulsive gambling in the financial markets, as well as the proportion of Dutch investors displaying 
no symptoms, 1 or 2 symptoms, 3 symptoms (“problem gamblers”) and 4 or more symptoms (“compulsive gamblers”). Panel B, “Proxies for Gambling Motives”, shows the 
proportion of investors who list investing for fun, or investing for a small chance to become risk, as one of their investment objectives. Further, Panel B shows the proportion 
of investors who gambled conventionally in the past 12 months (casinos, slot machines, sports betting, etc.), and the proportion of investors showing some propensity to 
gamble conventionally with real money at stake in the future (based on the DOSPERT scale). Panel B also shows the mean of the DOSPERT gambling risk-taking propensity 
scale of Weber et al. (2002) . The table shows the mean (or proportion) separately for the sample of investors from the DHS panel and the AFM panel, as well as for the 
combined sample of investors (DHS & AFM). ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significant differences in the mean or proportion between the DHS and AFM samples, at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level. 
Panel A: Compulsive gambling symptoms Combined Sample DHS Sample AFM Sample 
Mean Mean Mean 
APA DSM-5 compulsive gambling criteria 
Number of compulsive gambling symptoms (0–9 symptoms) 0.89 0.71 0.96 ∗
No symptoms (%) (Has no symptoms) 53.4% 65.1% 48.6% ∗∗∗
Some symptoms (%) (Has 1 or 2 symptoms) 38.6% 28.3% 42.9% ∗∗∗
Problem gamblers (%) (Has exactly 3 symptoms) 3.6% 0.9% 4.6% ∗
Compulsive gamblers (%) (Has 4 or more symptoms) 4.4% 5.7% 3.9% 
Observations 365 106 259 
Panel B: Proxies for gambling motives 
Sensation seeking motive (“Investing for fun or the challenge”) 44.7% 48.1% 43.2% 
Wealth aspiration motive (“Investing for a small chance to get rich”) 13.4% 10.4% 14.7% 
Past gamblers (Gambled conventionally in the last year) 10.7% 14.2% 9.3% 
Risk-taking gamblers (DOSPERT Gambling propensity > 1) 8.2% 9.4% 7.7% 







































































s  r more DSM-5 symptoms, there is another 3.6% with three
ymptoms that are potential “problem gamblers”, which a less
evere form of gambling disorder ( Volberg, 2001 ). Similar to our
tudy, Kamolsareeratana and Kouwenberg (2019) fielded a survey
mong Thai investors and found 4.9% compulsive gamblers and
.5% problem gamblers, respectively. Youn et al. (2016) report
hat 21.5% of a sample of Korean investors meet the criteria for
rading addiction, a substantially higher rate than we find in the
etherlands, but the prevalence rate of conventional gambling
ddictions in Korea is also about two to three times higher than in
ost other countries (at 5.1%). 9 Another key difference is that both
tudies used a convenience sample of investors, while our sample
s representative for individual investors in the Netherlands. 
.2. Summary statistics of gambling motives measures 
Panel B of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of our measures
or gambling motives. About 45% of the investors in both samples
ention “investing for the fun or the challenge” as one of their
nvestment goals, indicating that entertainment and sensation
eeking are common motives among Dutch individual investors.
n the other hand, only 10% (DHS) to 15% (AFM) indicate that
hey invest for a small chance to get rich. 
Further, only about 9% (AFM) to 14% (DHS) of the investors
articipated in conventional gambling activities in the last 12
onths. The mean of the DOSPERT scale is also close to 1 ( = “Very
nlikely”), confirming that gambling propensity among Dutch
nvestors is low. Only about 8% of the investors can be classified as
isk-taking gamblers based on the DOSPERT-scale, indicating that
hey may gamble with at least 100 euro of real money in casinos,
n card games, on slot machines, or in sports betting. 
We conclude that the number of Dutch investors displaying
irect and indirect gambling motives is substantially higher than
he number of potential trading addicts. This is important, as the
ompulsive gambling screen should be exclusive and only isolating
ore extreme cases of gambling in the stock market to be useful.
n the remainder of the paper, we will use the direct and indirect
roxies for gambling motives to further compare and contrast
ith the small group of compulsive gamblers to help validate9 The Korean National Gambling Control Commission (2016). 
w  
i  
ihe trading addiction scale. Finally, we note that there are no
ignificant differences in gambling motives between the AFM and
HS samples. 
.3. Profile of compulsive gamblers in the financial markets 
Table 3 compares the socio-demographic profile of compulsive
amblers in the financial markets (Column 1) to other individual
nvestors (Column 2), testing for significant differences (Column
). Trading addicts have lower education, lower income, and less
ealth, which agrees with the typical profile of gambling addicts
n other domains, who tend to have lower socioeconomic status
 Welte et al., 2015 ). Trading addicts also are more likely to engage
n conventional gambling activities (37.5%), such as gambling in
asinos and sports betting. However, we also note that there is
o perfect overlap between trading addiction and participating in
onventional gambling activities, as 8 out of the 16 (50%) potential
rading addicts indicate not having gambled conventionally during
he last 12 months and also show no propensity to do so in the
uture on the DOSPERT scale. 
.4. Relation with frequent stock trading 
We now test whether compulsive gambling is related to active
nd speculative stock trading behaviors by individual investors, to
alidate the scale. We combine both investor samples, DHS and
FM, given their similarity in terms of age, gender, trading expe-
ience, access to financial advice, and gambling motives. Moreover,
his assures us of having a sufficient number of observations to
stimate regression models for trading behavior, while we control
or any difference in the samples by including a dummy for AFM
espondents. 
We note that some of the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria in
ppendix A refer to difficulties with reducing or quitting trading
nancial products, which naturally should create a positive relation
ith a higher stock trading frequency and day trading. The pur-
ose of our tests in this section is to validate the trading addiction
cale by checking if it relates to trading behavior in the expected
ay. A significant positive relation is not guaranteed, however, as
nvestors could try to conceal their addiction problems, or give
ncorrect answers to the survey questions. 
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Table 3 
Profile of compulsive gamblers in the Dutch financial markets. 
This table compares the mean of socio-demographic variables and other variables between compulsive gamblers in the financial markets in Column (1) and all other investors 
in Column (2). Investors in the group “Compulsive Gamblers” meet the APA DSM-5 criteria for compulsive gambling in the financial markets (4 or more symptoms). Column 
(3) shows the difference in mean between compulsive gamblers and other investors. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significant differences in the mean or proportion between the two 
groups, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 








Age in years 59.6 60.8 −1.2 
Male 100.0% 92.6% 7.4% 
Single 25.0% 21.5% 3.5% 
Low education 18.8% 5.8% 12.9% ∗∗
High school education 25.0% 20.3% 4.7% 
Bachelor education 56.3% 41.9% 14.4% 
Master education 0.0% 32.0% −32.0% ∗∗∗
Low income ( < 39k euro) 31.3% 19.5% 11.8% 
Medium income (39k to 78k euro) 62.5% 39.2% 23.3% ∗
High income ( > 78k euro) 0.0% 32.6% −32.6% ∗∗∗
Low wealth ( < 50k euro) 43.8% 22.1% 21.7% ∗∗
Medium wealth (50k to 150k euro) 31.3% 23.0% 8.3% 
High wealth ( > 150k euro) 18.8% 44.5% −25.7% ∗∗
Has access to financial advisor 25.0% 22.3% 2.7% 
Controls 
Risk tolerance scale from 1 to 10 6.56 5.89 0.67 ∗
Financial literacy score (0–3 correct) 2.81 2.81 0.00 
Self-assessed investment skill (1–5) 2.50 2.95 −0.45 ∗∗
Overconfidence better-than-average (% who think they are better or just as good, but 
financial literacy below avg.) 
6.3% 11.7% −5.5% 
Gambling motives 
Sensation seeking motive (“Investing for fun or the challenge”) 56.3% 44.1% 12.1% 
Wealth aspiration motive (“Investing for a small chance to get rich”) 18.8% 13.2% 5.6% 
Past gamblers (Gambled conventionally in the last year) 37.5% 9.5% 28.0% ∗∗∗
Risk-taking gamblers (DOSPERT Gambling propensity > 1) 37.5% 6.9% 30.6% ∗∗∗
DOSPERT gambling scale (1 to 5) 1.61 1.12 0.49 ∗∗
Observations 16 349 
Table 4 
Trading behavior and financial situation of compulsive gamblers versus other investor groups. 
This table compares the trading behavior (Panel A) and financial situation (Panel B) between investor groups with different gambling motives, based on five proxies for 
gambling motives described in Section 2 . The investors in the “Baseline investor group” do not display any gambling motives for trading. Investors in the group “APA DSM-5 
compulsive gamblers” meet the criteria for compulsive gambling in the financial markets (displaying 4 or more out of 9 symptoms). The stock trading frequency scale: 
1 = I barely trade, 2 = 1–10 times/year, 3 = 1–10 times/month, 4 = 3–4 times/week, 5 = almost every day. Making ends meet scale (1–5): Investors were asked “How easily 
can your household make ends meet monthly?”, with a 5-point response scale ranging from 1 = “Very easy” to 5 = “Very Difficult”. Financial situation scale (1–5): investors 
were asked “What is your current financial situation?”, with possible responses ranging from 1 = “I have a lot of money leftover”, 2 = “I have some money leftover”, 3 = “I 
make ends meet exactly”, 4 = “I am slightly dipping into my savings”, to 5 = “I am running into debt”. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significant differences in the mean or proportion 
compared to the baseline group, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Stock trading frequency scale (1–5) 2.11 2.88 ∗∗∗ 2.41 ∗∗∗ 2.51 ∗∗∗ 2.53 ∗∗ 2.64 ∗∗∗
High trading frequency dummy (%) 5.5% 18.8% ∗∗ 6.5% 7.3% 11.1% 14.3% ∗
Day trading stocks (%) 13.1% 62.5% ∗∗∗ 24.2% ∗∗ 31.7% ∗∗∗ 33.3% ∗∗∗ 46.4% ∗∗∗
Invests in derivatives (%) 16.0% 37.5% ∗∗ 30.1% ∗∗∗ 28.6% ∗ 33.3% ∗∗ 26.7% 
Invests in leveraged products (%) 6.8% 18.8% ∗ 12.3% ∗ 10.2% 23.1% ∗∗∗ 23.3% ∗∗∗
Number of stocks 8.10 8.38 9.44 7.69 7.56 7.50 
Observations (N) 162 16 163 49 39 30 
Panel B: Financial situation 
Making ends meet scale (1–5) 1.79 2.47 ∗∗∗ 1.75 1.73 1.95 2.23 ∗∗∗
Financial situation scale (1–5) 1.94 2.80 ∗∗∗ 1.84 1.80 2.34 ∗∗ 2.41 ∗∗
Number of financial problems (1–8) 0.24 0.94 ∗ 0.30 0.33 0.79 ∗∗ 0.69 ∗
Making debt or using savings (%) 10.9% 33.3% ∗∗ 8.2% 6.1% 21.1% ∗ 20.7% 












s  Table 4 and Fig. 2 compare the trading behavior of investors
with different gambling motives, for the combined total sample of
365 investors. The baseline investor group in the first column of
Table 4 consists of respondents who indicate to have no gambling
motives at all. On average, most investors in the baseline group
do not trade stocks actively: just 1–10 times per year. Only 6%f the investors in the baseline group have a high stock trad-
ng frequency, and 13% day-trade stocks. The second column of
able 4 summarizes the trading behavior of compulsive gamblers,
he small group of 16 investors who display four or more DSM-5
ymptoms of trading addiction. The compulsive gamblers have a
ignificantly higher stock trading frequency on average compared




































High trading frequency Day trading stocks Invests in derivatives or leveraged products
Fig. 2. Trading behavior of investors with gambling motives. 
Note: this figure compares trading behavior between investor groups with different gambling motives, based on the five proxies for gambling motives described in Section 2 . 
The investors in the “Baseline group” do not have any gambling motives for trading, and this group is shown as a baseline for comparisons. Investors in the group “Compulsive 
gamblers (DSM-5)” meet the APA DSM-5 criteria for compulsive gambling in the financial markets, displaying 4 or more out of 9 symptoms. The three bars in figure show 
the percentage of investors in each group that: (1) have a high stock trading frequency, trading 3 times per week or more, (2) day-trade stocks, and (3) invested in derivatives 

































































4o the baseline group, and one out of five (19%) trades at least
hree times per week or more. Further, the day-trading rate of
3% among compulsive gamblers is about five times higher than
mong the baseline group (13%). 
As a contrast, we also examine trading behavior in four groups
f investors based on the direct and indirect proxies for gambling
otives. Among sensation seekers, investors who trade for fun,
nd wealth aspirers, who trade to become rich, the average trading
requency and the tendency to day-trade (24–32%) are significantly
igher than in the baseline group. However, there is no difference
n the prevalence of a high trading frequency (only 7%) in these
wo groups compared to the baseline (5.5%). 
We also form two groups based on the indirect proxies for
ambling motives, based on their conventional gambling activities.
he first group consists of investors who participated in conven-
ional gambling activities in the past twelve months (excluding
otteries). The second group exhibit some propensity to gamble
ith real money on the DOSPERT-scale. Table 4 shows that both
roups of conventional gamblers are about three times more likely
o day-trade stocks and twice as likely to have a high stock trading
requency, compared to the baseline group. For example, in the
roup of investors who show some gambling propensity based on
he DOSPERT-scale, about 50% day-trade stocks and 14% have a
igh stock trading frequency. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 show that active trading is more
ommon among compulsive gamblers in the financial markets,
nd among investors who also gamble conventionally. 10 The
ompulsive gamblers have the highest average trading frequency,
nd the highest rate of day-trading. Fig. 2 illustrates this pattern. 
Next, we estimate logit regression models for stock trading to
ontrol for other explanations such as overconfidence, risk toler-
nce, financial literacy, as well as socio-demographic variables. The10 Table 4 shows no significant difference in the mean number of stocks held by 
he investor groups. In the DHS sample we also have data on the portfolio fraction 
f financial assets invested in individual stocks, a better proxy for portfolio diver- 








r  odels include measures for risk tolerance ( Dohmen et al., 2011 ),
nancial literacy ( Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007 ) and the better-than-
verage form of overconfidence. Further, we include controls for
ge, gender, marital status, education level, income, wealth, stock
rading experience, and a dummy variable to account for any dif-
erences in trading behavior between the AFM and DHS samples. 
The results in Table 5 show that compulsive gamblers are
ore likely to have a high trading frequency and are more likely
o day-trade. The effect size is large: compulsive gamblers are
pproximately three times more likely to have a high stock trading
requency and to engage in day-trading. As a robustness check, we
ave also estimated the regressions in Table 5 with the number
f compulsive gambling symptoms (ranging from 0 to 9) as the
ndependent variable, which gives the same results. Table 5 also
hows that the other proxies for gambling motives, such investing
or fun, aspiring for riches or being a conventional gambler, mostly
o not have a significant relation with active stock trading, after
ontrolling for compulsive gambling and other variables. The only
xception is that investors who trade for fun tend to have a higher
tock trading frequency in Column (2) of Table 5 . 
These results verify that the compulsive gambling screen is ef-
ective at isolating a small group of investors with relatively active
rading behavior, who are potentially driven by a compulsive urge
o gamble. Among the control variables, we find that investors
ith higher risk tolerance and lower financial literacy are more
ikely to day-trade in Table 5 (Column 3). Investors who rate their
wn investment skills more favorably and those with higher risk
olerance tend to trade stocks more frequently (Column 2). 
.5. Derivatives and leveraged products 
We now test whether investors who display compulsive
ambling symptoms are more likely to invest in derivatives and
everaged products. Both derivatives and leveraged products are at-
ractive from a gambling perspective, as they allow retail investors
o achieve highly skewed and levered payoffs. However, due to
heir complex nature and low liquidity, these products are usually
elatively expensive to trade and carry high fees, increasing the
10 R. Cox, A. Kamolsareeratana and R. Kouwenberg / Journal of Banking and Finance 111 (2020) 105709 
Table 5 
Regression models for trading behavior. 
The table shows logit regression models for the investors’ trading behavior. The dependent variable in Column (1) is a dummy for high stock trading frequency: trading 
at least 3 times per week, or more. The dependent variable in Column (2) is the stock trading frequency scale (1-5): 1 = I barely trade, 2 = 1–10 times/year, 3 = 1–10 
times/month, 4 = 3–4 times/week, 5 = almost every day. The dependent variable in Column (3) is a dummy variable for day-trading: buying and selling the same stock 
within one day. The dependent variable in Column (4) is a dummy variable for investing in derivatives or leveraged products in the last 12 months. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 







Investing in derivatives 
or lev. products 
APA DSM-5 compulsive gamblers dummy 1.90 ∗∗∗ 1.39 ∗∗ 1.94 ∗∗ 1.38 ∗∗
DOSPERT gambling propensity dummy 1.18 0.72 1.00 ∗ 0.22 
Gambled last 12 months dummy 0.26 0.15 −0.02 0.54 
Investing for chance to become rich dummy 0.04 0.37 0.76 −0.00 
Investing for fun or the challenge dummy −0.12 0.52 ∗∗ 0.21 0.52 ∗
Risk tolerance 0.14 0.24 ∗∗∗ 0.31 ∗∗∗ 0.15 ∗
Financial literacy −1.18 ∗ −0.01 −0.79 ∗∗ 0.79 
Self-assessed investment skill 0.56 0.44 ∗∗∗ 0.13 0.26 
Overconfidence better than average −0.89 −0.08 −0.01 0.64 
High trading experience ( > 5 years) −0.48 −0.60 0.19 1.38 ∗
Age in years 0.04 ∗ 0.02 ∗ 0.01 0.00 
Male −0.17 0.53 −1.23 ∗∗ −0.10 
Single 0.63 −0.01 −1.12 ∗∗ 0.14 
Master degree 0.09 0.09 0.19 −0.12 
Low income ( < 39k euro) −0.82 −0.35 0.52 0.28 
High income ( > 78k euro) 0.40 0.30 −0.05 0.45 
Low wealth ( < 50k euro) −0.19 0.07 −0.08 −0.21 
High wealth ( > 50k euro) 0.48 0.16 −0.24 −0.05 
DHS panel member −1.63 ∗∗ −1.28 ∗∗∗ −0.15 −1.13 ∗∗∗
AFM respondent recruited by GfK −0.51 −0.26 0.06 −0.51 
Pseudo-R2 0.176 0.121 0.163 0.137 
































Making debt or using savings At least one financial problem
Fig. 3. Financial situation of investors with gambling motives 
Note: this figure compares the financial situation between investor groups with different gambling motives, based on the five proxies for gambling motives described in 
Section 2 . The investors in the “Baseline group” do not display any gambling motives for trading, and serves as a baseline for comparisons. Investors in the group “Compulsive 
gamblers (DSM-5)” meet the APA DSM-5 criteria for compulsive gambling in the financial markets, displaying 4 or more out of 9 symptoms. The two bars in figure show 
the percentage of investors in each group that: (1) are making debt or using savings, and (2) had at least one financial problem during the last 12 months. “Making debt 
or using savings” indicates that the investor answered “I am slightly dipping into my savings” or “I am running into debt” to the question “What is your current financial 










11 Bauer et al. (2009) argue that gambling and entertainment motives are the 
main drivers for option trading by Dutch retail investors. Related, Filippou et al. likelihood of poor returns. For example, Entrop et al. (2016) doc-
ument that retail investors typically realize negative abnormal
returns when investing in structured financial products. Further,
Bauer et al. (2009) show that Dutch investors tend to suffer larger
losses on their option investments than on their stock portfolios.
Hence, similar to active stock trading, it is puzzling why individ- (al investors choose to invest in these products, and gambling
otives may provide an explanation. 11 With our data, we now2018) show that there is a substitution effect between options and lottery stocks 
























































































































12 Results are similar if we use the number of compulsive gambling symptoms est whether compulsive gambling is a possible reason why some
ndividual investors invest in options and leveraged products. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that investors with compulsive gam-
ling symptoms are two times more likely to invest in derivatives
38%), compared to investors without any gambling motives (16%).
ocusing on leveraged products, Table 4 shows that investors
ith compulsive gambling symptoms are about two times more
ikely to invest in these products (19%), compared to the baseline
roup (7%). Investors in the four other groups based on direct
nd indirect proxies for gambling motives also show significantly
igher rates of investing in derivatives and leveraged products.
pecifically, those who gambled conventionally in the last 12
onths are more likely trade derivatives (33%) and leveraged
roducts (23%), suggesting that some investors use these financial
roducts as a substitute for conventional gambling. 
Table 5 shows estimates for a logistic regression model explain-
ng whether investors traded derivatives or leveraged products dur-
ng the past twelve months, while controlling for overconfidence,
isk tolerance, financial literacy, and socio-demographic variables.
n line with the results for stock trading, compulsive gamblers are
ore likely to invest in derivatives and leveraged products. The
ther proxies for gambling motives do not have a significant rela-
ion with investing in these products, after compulsive gambling
nd other variables have been controlled for. Only investing for
un has a positive relation with trading derivatives and leveraged
roducts at the 10% level. Other variables that show a marginally
ignificant relation with investing in derivatives and leveraged
roducts are higher risk tolerance and trading experience. 
.6. Relation with financial situation 
In the previous sections, we found that compulsive gambling is
ssociated with more active and speculative trading by individual
nvestors, beyond known factors like overconfidence, risk tolerance
nd financial literacy. As a further validation of the compulsive
rading scale, we now analyze how the DSM-5 screen relates to
he financial situation of the investors. The gambling literature
hows that compulsive gambling is typically associated with
nancial problems, debt and higher rates of personal bankruptcy
 Ladouceur et al., 1994 ; Gerstein et al., 1999 ). We note upfront
hat we cannot verify the causal direction of these relations, as
t also plausible that investors with financial problems and lower
ncome are more attracted to gambling. 
We use three measures for the investor’s financial situation.
irst, our survey directly asked the respondents about their Finan-
ial situation and their ability to Make ends meet , using 5-point
esponse scales (see Appendix A ). The survey also asked if the
espondent experienced eight common financial problems in the
ast year, such as receiving letters from a debt collection agency,
r being in arrears on mortgage or rent payments. We obtained
hese questions about eight types of financial problems from the
ational Institute of Household Budget Research (NIBUD), which
s an agency that studies household finances in The Netherlands.
e use the total number of affirmative answers, ranging from
 to 8, as a proxy for financial problems ( Number of financial
roblems ). Finally, we construct two dummy variables, one for
nvestors that indicate to accumulate debt or have to use their
avings to make ends meet, and one for investors with at least
ne financial problem excluding late bill payment (which arises
requently because people forget to pay). 
Panel B in Table 4 and Fig. 3 show the average financial





tompulsive gamblers, and groups based on the proxies for gam-
ling motives. Compulsive gamblers have significantly worse
cores on all indicators of financial situation compared to the
aseline investor group: they are three times more likely to
ccumulate debt or dip into their savings, and more than twice
s likely to have experienced at least one financial problem in
he last 12 months. A similar picture emerges for investors who
amble conventionally, although less extreme. Past gamblers and
isk-taking gamblers are about twice as likely to accumulate debt
r use their savings. On the other hand, investors who just trade
or fun, or for a chance to get rich, have a financial situation
imilar to the baseline group (no significant difference). 
Table 6 shows regression models for the three financial sit-
ation measures, including a full set of control variables. 12 The
esults confirm that compulsive gamblers tend to be in signifi-
antly worse financial situation and face more financial problems,
ompared to other investors with a similar socio-demographic
rofile. 13 Investors who gamble conventionally also report a worse
nancial situation. On the other hand, investing for fun and for a
mall chance to get rich are not associated with a worse financial
ituation and more financial problems, in line with the previous
esults for active and speculative trading behavior. 
. Discussion and limitations 
As pointed out earlier, some of the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria in
ppendix A refer to difficulties with reducing or quitting trading
nancial products, which by definition should create a positive
elation with more frequent stock trading. The purpose of our
ests in Section 4 was to validate the trading addiction scale by
hecking if it relates to trading frequency in the expected way. A
ositive relation was not guaranteed, as compulsive traders can
ry conceal their problems by giving false answers, and in general
eople may give incorrect answers to survey questions. Our results
n Section 4 thus suggests that untruthful or incorrect answers are
ot a major problem. In addition, one of the nine DSM-5 criteria
efers to “You have to borrow money from family members or
riends to cover the losses from trading in financial products”,
 question linked to the investor’s financial situation. Again, we
till test the relation between compulsive gambling and financial
ituation as a validation of the scale. 
One limitation of our research is that with a cross-sectional
ataset it is not possible to establish the direction of causality,
espite the inclusion of a wide variety of exogenous background
haracteristics in the regression models. This holds especially true
or the relation between compulsive gambling in the stock market
nd the investor’s financial situation. One way to interpret the re-
ults is that investors who gamble compulsive in the stock market
nd up in a relatively worse financial situation due to the costs
nd losses of their speculative trading strategies. Conversely, it is
lso conceivable that a relatively bad financial situation triggers
ndividuals to gamble in financial markets in an attempt to catch
p and quickly gain a large amount of wealth. Regardless of the
xact direction of causality, either scenario raises concerns and
arrants screening for compulsive gambling motives by brokers. 
Another limitation is that trading behavior is self-reported in
ur survey data, while we do not have evidence from actual trad-
ng records. However, our survey data has also some advantages
ver trading records from brokerage accounts. Investors can have0–9) as independent variable. 
13 Further, in results available on request we find that the compulsive gamblers in 
he DHS sample give a lower rating to their health condition than other investors. 
n general, DHS investors who display more compulsive gambling symptoms tend 
o report a lower health condition (correlation r = 0.23, p = 0.020). 
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Table 6 
Regression models for financial situation. 
The table shows regression models for the investors’ financial situation. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the making ends meet scale (1–5). Investors were asked 
“How easily can your household make ends meet monthly?”, with a response scale ranging from 1 = “Very easy” to 5 = “Very Difficult”. The dependent variable in Column 
(2) is the financial situation scale (1–5). Investors were asked “What is your current financial situation?”, with responses ranging from 1 = “I have a lot of money leftover” to 
5 = “I am running into debt”. In Column (3) the dependent variable is the number of financial problems, ranging from 0 to 7 (excluding late bill payment). Models (1) and 
(2) are estimated with an ordered logit regression, and Model (3) is a Poisson count model. 
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Making ends meet 
scale (1–5) 
Financial situation scale 
(1–5) 
Number of financial 
problems 
APA DSM-5 compulsive gamblers dummy 1.27 ∗∗∗ 1.44 ∗∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗
DOSPERT gambling propensity dummy 1.09 ∗∗ 0.47 0.47 
Gambled last 12 months dummy 0.01 1.16 ∗∗∗ 0.57 ∗
Investing for chance to become rich dummy −0.09 −0.27 0.02 
Investing for fun or the challenge dummy −0.29 −0.45 ∗ −0.31 
Risk tolerance −0.04 −0.01 0.03 
Financial literacy −0.83 ∗∗ −0.07 −0.70 ∗∗
Self-assessed investment skill −0.04 −0.23 ∗ 0.31 ∗
Overconfidence better than average −0.73 −0.17 −0.87 ∗
High trading experience ( > 5 years) −0.14 0.85 ∗∗ 0.49 
Age in years 0.01 0.03 ∗∗∗ −0.02 
Male 0.13 −0.12 −0.19 
Single 0.13 −0.01 −0.31 
Master degree 0.17 0.08 0.18 
Low income ( < 39k euro) 0.56 0.44 −0.35 
High income ( > 78k euro) −0.71 ∗∗ −0.71 ∗∗ −0.01 
Low wealth ( < 50k euro) 0.55 0.49 0.49 
High wealth ( > 50k euro) −0.72 ∗∗∗ −0.42 −0.26 
DHS panel member 0.45 ∗ 0.10 −0.50 
AFM respondent recruited by GfK 0.20 0.02 −0.21 
Pseudo-R2 0.135 0.104 0.108 































































f  multiple brokerage accounts such that data from one particu-
lar account may represent only a fraction of an investor’s total
portfolio and trading behavior. For example, an investor could be
passively investing in a portfolio of mutual funds in one account,
but actively churning lottery-type stocks in another brokerage
account. Our survey data represents the investors’ overall portfolio
and trading behavior, overcoming this limitation. Further, existing
studies analyzing trading records from one particular broker may
inadvertently sample a subgroup of more active investors that is
substantially different from the complete population, whereas our
data represents all Dutch investors. DHS survey data was used
previously in well-known studies of household portfolios, such as
Van Rooij et al. (2011) and Von Gaudecker (2015) . 
6. Conclusions 
We estimate the prevalence of compulsive gambling in the
financial markets, in a representative sample of Dutch investors.
Our results reveal that 4.4% of the Dutch retail investors show
symptoms of compulsive gambling, or an addiction to trading,
with a 95% confidence interval of [2.5%, 7.0%]. Another 3.6% of the
investors display symptoms of problem gambling ([1.9%, 6.0%]),
which is less a severe condition, but still worrisome. 
We validate the compulsive gambling scale by testing whether
investors with compulsive gambling symptoms pursue more active
and speculative trading styles. Our results show that the compul-
sive gambling scale is strongly correlated with speculative trading
behavior, beyond factors like overconfidence, risk tolerance, finan-
cial literacy and trading experience. We compare the compulsive
gambling screen to direct and indirect proxies for gambling mo-
tives such as trading for fun, trading for a small chance to become
rich, and participating in conventional gambling activities (casinos,
sports betting, etc.). We find that investors with more innocuous
gambling motives, like trading for fun or a chance to become rich,
do not display more active trading behavior. Our results show that the APA DSM-5 screen for compulsive
ambling isolates a relatively small subgroup of investors and is
he best predictor for speculative trading behavior, which is es-
ential for practical purposes. Investors with compulsive gambling
endencies are also in a worse financial situation compared to
ther investors and have more financial problems, after controlling
or socio-demographic characteristics. 
Our data also reveal that the large majority of investors in the
utch population trade stocks less than 10 times a year, and do
ot invest in derivatives or leveraged products. Only a small group
f investors follow more active and speculative trading strategies,
ith day-trading and investing in derivatives being common
trategies pursued by about one out of five (20%) direct investors.
creening for compulsive gambling may help to further identify
nd separate the small group of investors who trade actively
ecause they cannot resist or stop their urge to gamble in financial
arkets. In our sample, one out of 23 direct investors (4.4%)
isplay symptoms of compulsive trading in financial markets. 
Future research could shed more light on the causes and conse-
uences of compulsive gambling in the financial markets, and test
o what extent gambling-motivated trading is influenced by past
ains and losses. Moreover, since gambling behavior is strongly
nfluenced by local norms and regulations ( Kumar et al., 2011 ),
urther work can test the generalizability of our findings to other
ountries. For example, an open question is whether compulsive
ambling in the financial markets is more or less widespread in
ountries where conventional gambling activities are more strictly
egulated. 
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ppendix A. Selected survey questions 
.1. Investment objectives 
Our survey asks investors to indicate their investment objec-
ives, choosing from seven possible answers (multiple answers are
llowed): 
1. Saving for retirement, or to generate additional income. 
2. Saving for a special expense ( e.g. , a new car or vacation). 
3. Saving for a specific purpose, such as mortgage prepayment, or
the kids’ education. 
4. Preserving my wealth. The money is not needed for any specific
goal or expense, and it should just maintain its value. 
5. The fun or challenge of investing. 
6. Investing gives me a small chance to get rich, and I am willing to
take risk for this purpose. 
7. Another purpose (an open response category). 
.2. DOSPERT gambling risk-taking propensity 
The DOSPERT scale consists of the following four questions: 
How likely is it that you will participate in the following activities?
1. Betting with 100 euro or more on a slot machine. 
2. Betting with 100 euro or more in a poker game, or in an online
casino game. 
3. Betting with 100 euro or more on the result of sports game, or in
a sports betting pool. 
4. Betting with 500 euro or more in a casino. 
Each question is answered on this 5-point scale: 
1. Very unlikely, 2. Unlikely, 3. Neither likely, nor unlikely, 4. Likely,
5. Very Likely. 
.3. APA DSM-5 compulsive gambling criteria adopted to financial 
arkets 
The following questions are about your of trading of financial prod-
cts, such as individual company stocks, ETF’s (index trackers), deriva-
ives and leveraged products (such as turbo’s, speeders, binary options
nd contracts for differences). While answering these questions please
onsider your actual trading activities during the last 12 months. 
1. You trade financial products with larger amounts of money to
maintain the excitement. 
2. You have to borrow money from family members or friends to
cover the losses from trading in financial products. 
3. You always think of ways to get money to trade financial products.
4. You lie to your family or friends about your trading in financial
products. 
5. You tried to reduce your trading of financial products, or to quit
altogether, but could not. 
6. You trade financial products to escape problems in your life. 
7. You trade more in order to win back your previous losses. 
8. You have problems in your work, with family members or with
your partner as a consequence of your trading in financial
products. 
9. You become irritated when trying to reduce or quit trading
financial products. 
The response scale for each question is: 1. Never, 2. Sometimes.
. Often, 4. All the time . We count the answers “Sometimes”, “Often” and “All the time”
s 1, and “Never” as 0, when counting the number of compulsive
ambling symptoms of the respondents. 
.4. Financial situation questions 
Question 1: What is your current financial situation? 
1. I have a lot of money leftover 
2. I have some money leftover 
3. I make ends meet exactly 
4. I am slightly dipping into my savings 
5. I am running into debt 
Question 2: How easy is it for you to make ends meet? 
1. Very easy 
2. Easy 
3. Neither easy nor difficult 
4. Difficult 
5. Very Difficult 
Question 3: Did your household experience any of the following
vents in the past twelve months? 
1. Payment of bills overdue 
2. Received a payment reminder 
3. Unable to draw money from your checking account 
4. Automatic transfer was refused 
5. Received payment notices from a debt collection agency 
6. More than 10 days late with rental or mortgage payments 
7. Seizure of income 
8. Late payment of health insurance premium 
The answer scale for all eight financial problem questions is: 
1. No, 2. Yes, sometimes, 3. Yes, regularly, 4. Not applicable, 5. Don’t
know/Refuse to answer 
.5. Financial literacy questions 
Question 1: Suppose that you have 100 euro on a savings account
nd the interest is 20% per year, and you never withdraw the money
r interest. How much do you have on the account after 5 years? 
(a) More then 200 euro, (b) Exactly 200 euro, (c) Less than
00 euro, (d) I do not know, (e) Refuse to answer 
Question 2: Suppose the interest on your savings account is 1% per
ear and the inflation is 2% per year. After 1 year, can you buy more,
xactly the same, or less than today with the money on the account? 
(a) More than today, (b) Exactly the same as today, (c) Less than
oday, (d) I do not know, (e) Refuse to answer 
Question 3: Is the following statement true, or not true? 
’A company stock usually provides a less risky return than an
quity mutual fund.’ 
(a) True, (b) Not true, (c) I do not know, (d) Refuse to answer 
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